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Abstract 
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Purpose:  The main purpose of this study is to investigate whether different 
ownership identities has any effect on the levels of cash amongst 
firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) main markets. 
The examined types of owners are family owners, insider owners and 
institutional owners.  
 
Methodology:  A quantitative approach with the interpretation of the results from a 
panel data regression 
 
Theoretical framework:  Agency Theory, Stewardship Theory, Theories related to the 
determinants of cash holdings, Theory of Ownership Identity 
 
Empirical foundation:  A sample of 209 firms during the time period 2008-2013 
 
Conclusions:  We come to the conclusion that different types of owners have an 
impact on the cash levels in firms listed on the SSE main markets. 
Through or regression models we found statistical significant 
evidence that family owners and insider owners affect corporate cash 
holdings. The observed relationship between family owners and cash 
holdings contradicts previous research; besides this the results were 
in line with previous findings. The relationship between 
institutionally owned firms and cash holdings are weaker, raising the 
question whether institutions are as active as they are supposed to be 
when it comes to monitoring and disciplining of management.    
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1. Introduction  
 
This chapter provides an introduction and background to the study and reports the thesis’ problem 
discussion, purpose and research questions. Finally this chapter discusses this thesis’ research 
contribution. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.1 Background 
 
According to an article published in Businessweek, S&P 500 companies held record amounts of cash 
and liquid investments on their balance sheets in 2013, representing a 50 % increase in just four 
years (Popelka, 2013). The fact that many companies have unproductive cash resources on their 
balance sheets irritates many investors and confuses researchers. The notorious American activist 
investor, Carl Icahn, has openly criticized Apple for holding too much cash and stated that the 
company’s shareholder value would increase if the company distributed their excess cash among the 
shareholders (La Roche, 2014). 
 
Corporate cash holdings have increased rapidly recent years, and it is not just a trend observed in US 
markets. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) have published an article on the European market, which found 
that, in 2000, companies held 15% of their total of assets in cash or cash equivalents.  
 
According to an article published in Dagens Industri in 2014, several Swedish companies also hold 
large amounts of cash. The pattern observed on both the US and the European market is also 
present on the Swedish market. Family-owned H&M is one Swedish firm that tops the list of having 
cash on their balance sheet (Dagens Industri, 2014) and according to their annual report in 2012, 
41% of their net total assets consisted of cash.  
 
The existence and the size of corporate cash holdings have engaged both researchers and business 
experts for years. Jensen (1986) argues that excess cash holdings will be exploited by managers, 
spending the money according to their own interest if the excess cash is not transferred to the 
owners. Myers & Majluf (1984) argues that cash holdings provide a less expensive financing 
alternative than debt and equity, and therefore see cash holdings as something positive. In other 
words, theories regarding corporate cash holdings can be seen as a double-edged sword.  
6 Hedman & Persson (2014) 
 
1.2 Problem discussion 
 
If managers were left alone they would exploit and waste the corporation’s resources. This is one of 
the main assumptions behind the agency theory and has been widely used to explain agency costs in 
the modern corporation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Dittmar & Smith (2007) found that cash and 
marketable securities to total assets, increased from 5 % in 1990 to 13 % in 2003 among large 
publicly traded firms in the US. To put things in a bigger perspective, the aggregated cash held by 
these firms corresponded to 10 % of the annual U.S. GDP in 2003.  
 
Internal cash is the optimal way for managers to finance the daily operations. Internally generated 
cash is also a good alternative to external financing of projects since it is cheaper due to lower 
transaction costs. However, if the cash is used inappropriately it can actually reduce the firm value. 
There is a chance that self-serving managers spend the cash in an inefficient way and therefore one 
dollar of cash is not always worth one dollar (Dittmar & Smith, 2007). This is supported by the 
findings of Faulkender & Rong (2006) who found that the value of one dollar in cash often is worth 
less than one dollar since the value is reduced from the risk that opportunistic managers will use it 
inefficiently. For the average firm in their sample one dollar was worth $0.94. 
 
It is well known that the identity of a controlling shareholder has important implications for firm-
specific policies and corporate governance. Different categories of owners have different objectives 
and incentives with their investments, and the level of commitment in the firm might differ between 
different owner groups (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). It is therefore fair to assume that the identity 
of a controlling owner might affect a firm’s cash holding policy.  
 
An attempt to investigate the relationship between the owner identity and firms cash holdings was 
made by Ozkan & Ozkan in 2004. They examined whether firms controlled by families vs. 
institutions had different attitudes towards cash holdings. They reasoned that the UK market had 
distinct corporate governance differences from other foreign markets, especially the US market, and 
that this ultimately could affect the cash holding policies of firms. According to the authors, the UK 
corporate sector is characterized by insufficient market discipline due to institutions being too 
passive in their monitoring duties. Therefore, they assumed that institutions had little influence on 
manager’s attitudes towards cash holdings and their results confirmed this hypothesis. In contrast to 
institutions, there was a significant positive relationship between having a controlling family owner 
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and the cash holding policy of a firm. Their results clearly show that the identity of the controlling 
owner can affect the level of cash holdings. 
 
Since cash holdings can lead to value deterioration if used irresponsibly this is an interesting topic to 
investigate. The fact that cash holdings often represent a big fraction of a firm’s total asset base, and 
that managers have easy access to these internal funds makes this topic even more compelling. And 
since effective corporate governance is the shareholders defense against managers wasteful spending 
of cash, our choice of topic is highly relevant.  
 
There is a broad consensus in the literature that high levels of excess cash can have a deteriorating 
effect on firm value. Still, we can observe a global pattern of increasing cash levels in firms, a trend 
that clearly indicates a problem for owners that want to maximize the value of their investments. 
The owners of a firm are the ones that ultimately can change this worrying pattern and it ought to be 
a priority for every controlling owner since it could increase the firm value and hence the value of 
their investments. Even though this ought to be a prioritized objective for every owner, we know 
that owners differ in terms of commitment in their investments. It is therefore interesting to 
investigate whether the identity of the ultimate owner affects the level of cash holdings in Swedish 
listed firms.  
 
1.3. Purpose 
 
 
The question whether cash holdings are beneficial or not for firm’s shareholders is beyond the 
primary focus of this study. Instead, we aim to investigate whether there is any relationship between 
corporate cash holdings and the identity of controlling owners.  
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between ownership identities and 
corporate cash holdings on the Swedish stock market between the years 2009 and 2013. The 
examined identities include family owners, insider owners and institutional owners. Much research 
has been done on the determinants of corporate cash holdings (i.e. Opler et al. (1999); Harford et al. 
(2008); Ferreira & Vilela (2004)) but there is only a limited body of research focusing on ownership 
structure and it’s effect on cash levels (i.e. Ozkan & Ozkan (2004)).  
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Following previous research this study aims to investigate whether similar relationships can be 
observed for firms listed on the Swedish market. Instead of focusing on the general cash 
determinants, this study intends to analyze ownership variables and their relation to corporate cash 
holdings. The Swedish market place provides a unique and interesting governance setting with 
several family and institutionally owned firms with strong controlling owners (La Porta et al. (1999)). 
Our aim is to investigate whether this setting has any implications on corporate cash levels and if the 
results observed are in line with previous research (i.e. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004)).  
 
1.4 Research question 
 
To investigate the relationship and pattern between corporate cash holdings and ownership 
structure, the following research question is the focus of our study: 
  
● Does the identity of the controlling shareholder impact the level of cash holdings in Swedish 
listed firms? 
 
1.5 Research contribution 
 
This study contributes to the literature in several aspects. Firstly, our access to the database SIS 
Ägarservice provides us with detailed information about the ownership structures in firms. The 
database also have a built-in function that allows us to group owners that are presumed to vote 
together into spheres, a detailed discussion regarding this follows in 3.5.2 Explanatory variables. This 
feature gives us a more accurate picture of the ultimate owners in Swedish firms concerning the size 
of their total voting rights. As far as we are aware of, a similar method has not been used in previous 
research on this topic.  
 
We also believe this to be the first study to investigate the relationship between ownership identity 
and corporate cash holdings amongst Swedish listed firms. Not only do we contribute with findings 
on the Swedish market, but we also investigate this topic on a non Anglo-Saxon market that might 
have implications for our results.  
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2. Theoretical framework and empirical hypotheses 
 
This chapter includes theories relevant to our research topic as well as the results from previous 
empirical research. The thought is to give the reader a basic understanding of the theories underlying 
our research topic. The theories as well as the empirical research will later serve as a foundation to 
the hypotheses we make, as well as a framework to analyze our results from. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
2.1 Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory can be seen as the main paradigm underlying corporate governance and the research 
related to this topic. It has been widely used to address the separation between ownership and 
control, and how principals can incur losses given that the agents act in a manner that diverge from 
the principals interest. (Davis et al., 1997) 
 
The foundation of agency theory is based on the assumptions about the human being and its 
behavior. Agency theory models the human being as a rational person whose main objective is to 
maximize his or hers personal utility (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The rise of the modern corporation 
created a setting where ownership of wealth was separated from the control of it. Even though 
owners were reluctant to give up control of their wealth, new market conditions such as an increased 
capital needs, forced them to do so (Berle & Means, 1932). The implication of this is that the 
modern corporation often has several different owners, each with the intention to maximize the 
value of their investment in the firm (Davis et al., 1997).  
 
Owners become principals as soon as they contract managers to run their firms for them. By 
contracting with the owners, the managers become an agent who is morally responsible for 
maximizing their principal’s wealth. However, agents accept their position since they believe that 
they can maximize their own utility by doing so. Therefore, the modern corporation includes 
principals and agents, motivated by opportunities for their own personal benefits. This relationship 
is vulnerable to conflicting interests and that is the rationale behind the need of effective corporate 
governance systems. (Davis et al., 1997) 
 
If both principals and agents share the same goals there is no agency problem. The problems appear 
when there is a divergence of interests between them. This leads to agency costs for the principals, 
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since given the opportunity of conflicting interests, agents will try to maximize their own utility on 
behalf of the principals. To reduce agency costs and to avoid situations where agents exploit their 
principals, internal control systems are designed to discipline the managers. (Davis et al., 1997) 
 
Two internal control mechanisms that has been widely adopted in organizations are the use of 
corporate governance structures and specific compensation programs to top executives. According 
to agency theorists, compensation programs should be structured so that the executive is rewarded 
for performances related to shareholder interests, thereby aligning the objectives between principals 
and agents. A governance structure is another internal control mechanism aimed to make the agent 
act according to the best interest of their principals. Governance structure can be in the form of a 
board of directors, where the board members preferably do not have any ties to the management to 
ensure effective monitoring of the executives. If these internal control mechanism fail to curb 
managers, external market discipline will emerge, however this is a more expensive form of control. 
(Davis et al., 1997) 
 
2.2 Stewardship theory 
 
The main difference between agency theory and stewardship theory are the assumptions regarding 
managerial behavior in organizations. Even though agency theory appears to be a dominant 
paradigm in corporate governance the assumptions about self-serving behavior and individualistic 
utility maximization may not hold for all managers. Agency theory provides a good framework for 
addressing divergence between the principal and the agent but additional theory is needed to try to 
explain the factors that can cause alignment between the principal and the agents. (Davis et al., 1997) 
 
Stewardship theory is based on the research of psychologists and sociologists and was designed in an 
attempt to examine different situations where managers as stewards act according to the best 
interests of their principals. The underlying assumption about mankind is that pro-organizational 
and collectivistic behavior has a stronger and more positive effect on a manager private utility than 
self-serving behavior. Given a situation where a manager can either choose between maximizing her 
own utility or choose the alternative that is in the best interest of the organization, the steward will 
choose the latter. Even in situations where the steward and the principal have different opinions 
about something, the steward rather cooperates than fights against the principal. The stewards 
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behavior can be considered rational, since she places a greater utility in cooperative behavior and act 
accordingly. (Davis et al., 1997) 
 
The stewardship theory assumes a strong connection between the performance of the organization 
and the principal’s satisfaction. In a setting with multiple shareholders, the steward’s behavior and 
actions will be organizationally centered and in the best interest of the firm and of the group. Even 
though different shareholders may all have different objectives, it is fair to assume that they all wish 
to see a successful firm since it will maximize their wealth in the long run. Due to the pro-
organizational assumptions about the steward; the needs of many competing shareholders can be 
satisfied. Stewards certainly have personal needs as well. For stewards, there is a trade-off between 
personal needs and organizational objectives and the stewards believe that their personal needs can 
be met given that they work hard and perform their duties according to the organizational objective. 
(Davis et al., 1997) 
 
The main difference between agency theory and stewardship theory lies in psychological factors, 
such as the “model of man”. Stewardship theorists argue that the agency framework where man is 
rooted in economic rationality is too simplistic, and instead propose for a more humanistic model of 
man. The view of different types of motivational factors is also different where stewardship theorists 
argue that managers are driven by intrinsic rewards such as opportunities for growth and 
achievement rather than extrinsic rewards such as tangible commodities that have a measurable 
value. Several other notable distinctions between stewardship theory and agency theory are 
identification with the organization, management philosophy and cultural aspects such as 
individualism vs. collectivism. (Davis et al., 1997)  
 
Even though the agency theory remains as a paradigm for corporate governance and helps us 
understand the potential conflicts that can arise when ownership is separated from control, its 
underlying assumptions may not hold for all firms and managers. Organizational relationships are 
complex and the factors explaining managerial behavior are many. Therefore, an alternative 
approach to agency theory, such as the stewardship theory, is needed. (Davis et al., 1997)  
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2.3 Capital structure 
 
The first generally accepted theory on capital structure was presented by Modigliani & Miller (1958), 
who stated that a firm's choice of capital structure is irrelevant. This was based upon the idea that a 
firm has a set of cash flows and debt and equity is only used to finance the assets needed to produce 
these cash flows. The proportions of debt and equity do therefore only divide the firm’s cash flows 
among its investors. Hence, leverage does not affect the value of firms. (Modigliani & Miller, 1958) 
 
Their paper led to both clarity and controversy. It was criticized due to the fact that it assumed 
perfect market conditions and thus ignored factors such as: tax, transaction costs, agency conflict, 
bankruptcy costs and adverse selection. Even if the theory has been questioned it is still embraced 
for providing a meaning for further research on capital structure.  (Frank & Goyal, 2007) 
 
When the assumption of perfect capital markets is relaxed, firm specific explanations towards 
corporate cash holdings arise and are explained in the following section. According to Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004) there are three primary theoretical frameworks that address the issue of which firm 
characteristics that influence the cash holding decisions amongst firms. These three models will be 
discussed below.  
 
2.3.1 Trade-off model 
 
The model is a based on a trade-off between the benefits and costs of holding cash. It identifies 
three main benefits: firstly, cash reduces the risk of financial distress since it provides a safety reserve 
for unexpected costs or external financing restrictions. The second argument is that cash supplies a 
financing source enabling firms to pursue with investments in times when external funds are not 
available. Finally cash contributes to lowering firms’ cost of capital since it is cheaper than raising 
external funds or liquidating other existing assets. These benefits are weighed against the alternative 
costs of holdings cash, since liquid assets generate low rates of return. (Ferreira & Viela, 2004) 
 
2.3.2 Pecking Order Theory 
 
Myers (1984) states that firms follow a pecking order when deciding which funds to use in the 
financing of investments. First off, firms prefer to finance projects with internal funds. Secondly, 
they will adjust their dividend levels, even if dividends tend to follow a sticky policy. Firms will 
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thereafter choose to sell liquid assets and finally use external capital as a last resort. If external 
financing is needed firms prefer debt, then hybrid securities such as convertibles and finally the 
issuance of equity. (Myers, 1984) 
 
This order of financing comes from the theory of asymmetric information and that managers’ 
objectives are to minimize the costs related to this. Managers have more knowledge on investment 
needs and the net present value of those investments. The managers are also assumed to act in favor 
of the firm’s current owners and will therefore try to issue new shares at the highest possible price. 
Equity investors aware of this issue will demand a higher risk premium. This premium is 
consequently based on information asymmetry, which increases the costs of financing investments 
with new equity. This is the logic for companies preferring debt to equity. (Myers & Majluf, 1984) 
 
2.3.3 Jensen’s Free Cash Flow Hypothesis  
 
Michael Jensen published a pioneering paper in 1986, analyzing the major agency conflicts tied to 
corporate cash holdings. He claimed that cash holdings create major agency conflicts between 
owners and managers and yet, it is an aspect that had received little attention. According to the 
agency theory managers are assumed to act according to their own interests in activities that 
maximizes their power and personal benefits. Thus, managers want to hoard as much of the free 
cash flows as possible and will always strive to keep their firms well capitalized. Jensen (1986) 
presents several crucial risks with this behavior. 
 
Managers want to increase their power and will therefore engage in activities that build up 
substantial amounts of free cash flows (cash flows in excess after funding all projects with positive 
net present values).  Since payouts to the company’s shareholders reduce the resources under 
managers’ control it also reduces their power. Besides increasing managers’ power, large cash levels 
are also exposed to the risk of wasteful spending. Managers of well-capitalized firms tend to spend 
money on unprofitable investments in pursuit of building their own “empires”. For the firms that 
have free cash flows agency costs arise due to the monitor needs of these managers. Corporate cash 
holdings also reduce the pressure on managers’ performance. Simply, the requirements to perform 
tend to be low when firms already have substantial amounts of cash on their accounts. (Jensen, 
1986) 
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Firms that finance their investments with internal funds do not have to approach the capital markets 
and provide them with detailed information about the firm. This increases the agency costs for the 
owners and is the underlying idea behind the argument that firms should pay out free cash flows to 
their owners and raise debt instead. Another argument for debt being an efficient way to monitor is 
that the promise to pay back debt is much stronger than the promise to pay back equity through 
dividends. Even if managers promise to pay out the free cash flows, they can still change the firm’s 
dividend policies in the future. Debt however, is more restrictive and if a creditor does not receive 
the agreed upon payments she can take the firm into bankruptcy (Jensen 1986). Concluding, free 
cash flows carry high agency costs and increased monitoring from owners or debt holders force 
organizations to be more efficient and overcome managerial resistance.  
 
2.4 Ownership and Control in Sweden 
 
The Swedish corporate governance model is often described as a combination of the Continental 
European and the Anglo-Saxon systems. This unique setting has been surprisingly successful in 
generating many large internationally recognized companies. The market has a few strong 
commercial banks that are considered house banks for the large companies in line with many other 
Continental European countries. The banks have often held substantial blocks of shares in their 
clients firms. Another distinguishing feature is the presence of financial families with large 
blockholings, i.e. the Wallenberg family that controls companies worth half the market value of the 
stock exchange. Yet, there are also similarities to the Anglo-Saxon setting. One example is that the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange is very liquid with both market capitalization and turnover per capita 
levels are among the highest in Europe. (Agnblad et al., 2002) 
 
The mix of systems combined with strong separation of ownership and control should result in 
underdeveloped markets with companies in strong need of capital, and not a well working world-
class equity market (Agnblad et. al, 2002). Hence, Sweden has been a puzzling case for many of the 
leading corporate governance researchers (such as La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999).   
 
The Swedish governance setting allows for concentrated ownership, and hence many listed 
companies can remain in the control of a strong owner for several generations. The legal systems 
allows both for pyramid holdings and dual-class shares, which allows family control over large 
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companies. Dual-class share is the strongest anti-takeover provision in Sweden. It enables 
shareholders to control a firm without owning a proportional stake of the capital. Both classes of 
shares have the same right to dividends but the voting rights are allowed to be 10 times higher for 
A-shares (up to 1000 times higher for shares issued in the past). (Agnblad et al., 2002) 
 
Pyramidal ownership that enables a small group of investors to control majority stakes in one 
company, that in turn controls large stakes in several other companies, is allowed for in Sweden. The 
dual-share system is more widely used than pyramid holdings. This is a unique setting in an 
international perspective and La Porta et al. (1999) states that Sweden is one of only a few countries 
that allow both systems. An absolute majority of legal systems allow only one of the powerful ways 
to separate voting power and capital contribution. These arrangements undermine the minority 
shareholders protection and make them vulnerable to abuse, yet there are few examples of violation 
in the Swedish corporate governance history. (Agnblad et al., 2002) 
 
One indication of a conflict between minority shareholders and controlling owners is the substantial 
discount (20-30%) on closed-end investment funds (such as Wallenberg’s Investor or 
Handelsbanken’s Industrivärden) over the fund’s Net Asset Value (NAV). These funds have 
adopted a pyramid ownership structure and usually have a private controlling owner. Even though 
it’s an indication of conflicts, it is still not an indication of poor minority protection since investors 
pay a fair price for the diluted ownership. The general explanation to why minority interests are not 
exploited is informal mechanisms such as the social status and reputation that comes with being a 
controlling owner. (Agnblad et al., 2002) 
 
The Swedish governance system stands before several challenges in the future and the transition of 
ownership is already changing. Over the last decade there has been significant capital inflows from 
investors outside Sweden. The new, often anonymous institutional investors are less likely to share 
the values of long-termism and obey to the informal arrangements in the Swedish corporate 
governance system. Another threat associated with more globalized capital markets is the increased 
relative cost of raising equity for the large companies in Sweden, due to a larger risk premium 
required from international investors expecting the same one-share-one-vote system as they are used 
to. Changes have already been observed, and two examples are ABB and AstraZeneca who 
abandoned the dual-share system after a cross-border transaction. (Agnblad et al., 2002) 
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Agnblad et al. (2002) summed up sphere ownership to group owners with the same interests and 
therefore are presumed to vote aligned. The groups are then classified in different categories. Most 
important is that the companies in the Svenska Handelsbanken sphere are categorized as financial 
institutions and companies in the Wallenberg sphere are classified as family owned. This grouping 
does not have any clear definition and is based on a subjective evaluation, which makes the 
definition hard to compare internationally. Yet, the spheres play a very central role in Swedish 
corporate governance and should be accounted for. 
 
2.5 Theory of ownership identity 
 
It is well understood that the identity of a controlling shareowner has important implications for 
firm specific characteristics and corporate governance. Different types of owners have different 
objectives and incentives with their investments and the level of commitment in a firm might differ 
between different owner groups (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). 
 
In this section we aim to present relevant theory related to different owner identities. Further we will 
look at previous research in order to finally conclude our hypotheses regarding the owners’ effects 
on corporate cash holdings. 
 
2.5.1 Family ownership 
 
One important group of controlling owners is private individuals and families. Faccio and Lang 
(2002) found that out of 5232 Western European companies, 44% was family controlled. The 
number for Sweden is even higher, where 61% out of 304 examined firms where in the controlling 
hands of a private individual or a family (Agnblad et al., 2002).  
 
Even though family controlled firms are very common in the modern corporate society, there is 
little theory and empirical research about the family’s impact on firm specific characteristics  
(Schulze et al., 2001). Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) is one of the few studies that investigate the impact 
of controlling family owners on cash holdings. According to the authors, there is a much bigger 
chance that controlling family members get involved in the direct management of the firms, than in 
their non-family counterparts, e.g. institutionally owned firms. In turn, this will lead to higher agency 
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costs between the management of the firm and non-family shareholders. Following this setting, the 
monitoring ability of that specific firm may become worse and that will ultimately lead to higher 
cash holdings in family controlled firms.  
 
Belenzon & Zarutskie (2012) investigated the relationship between family ownership and company 
performance and financing decisions. They find that many of the family owned companies maintain 
a conservative cash policy and often use retained earnings to fund investment opportunities. The 
family owned firms often have low operating costs and try to keep wage levels down. Following this, 
family owned companies have high cash holdings. 
 
Following the theoretical framework and empirical research about a controlling family owners 
impact on cash holding, we have set up a hypothesis of a positive relationship between family 
ownership and cash holdings.  
 
2.5.2 Institutional ownership 
 
Ever since the restrictions concerning international ownership in Sweden was abolished in 1993, 
there has been a significant capital inflow to the Swedish stock markets. The international investors 
are primarily institutions that have challenged the Swedish control structures, such as the dual-class 
shares system. Their criticism indicates an appetite for increased voting rights so that they can take 
an active role in monitoring the firms. (Jakobsson & Wiberg, 2014) 
 
Institutional investors are those that primarily focus on capital investments as their general operating 
activities. They differ much from individual owners as they usually manage large pools of someone 
else’s capital and use it to make large investments in several different corporations. Because of these 
large investments, they should have strong incentives to spend more time and resources on 
monitoring these corporations (Grinstein & Michaely, 2005). It is often argued that the interests of 
the institutional owners coincide with those of the minority owners. The institutional investors tend 
to emphasize the importance of value maximization and that this value ought to be shared equally 
amongst all shareholders of a firm. This is of great importance in countries with low levels of 
minority protection. (Jakobsson & Wiberg, 2014).  
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Another dimension that distinguishes institutions from other owners are regulations (Grinstein & 
Michaely, 2005). As Nachemson-Ekwall (2012) points out, Swedish institutions have to adjust to 
internal rules regarding accountability as well as rules that reflect financial theory such as efficient 
portfolio management. As a result they often follow a passive index strategy, which is cheaper and 
less risky than an active fund management strategy. It is also common that institutions buy services 
from external advisors concerning recommendations and information (Jakobson & Wiberg, 2014). 
Swedish institutions also have to account for external regulations regarding their influence of the 
management in each and every company they have an ownership stake in. There are rules regarding 
the size of the holdings in a company, i.e. some institutions have a limit of how much they can own 
in a single company, often somewhere between 5 to 10 %.  The legislator’s idea behind the 
regulations was to minimize the risk of collective funds having the decisive power in a company 
(Nachemson-Ekwall, 2012).    
 
When it comes to the relationship between institutional ownership and cash holdings, the theory 
suggests that there should be a negative relationship between institutional ownership and cash 
holdings. From an agency theory perspective, enhanced monitoring leads to firms paying out more 
of the free cash flow to their owners instead of keeping it within the firm (Jensen, 1986). However, 
this implies that the institutions have superior monitoring abilities and take an active role in 
monitoring and disciplining firms’ management (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004).  
 
Despite the setting in Sweden, with rules limiting the Swedish institutions influence in firms’ and 
their own internal passive investment strategies, we believe that the institutions take an active role in 
monitoring and disciplining the management in firms’ to avoid situations where managers follow a 
self-serving behavior, and hoard cash for their own good. We also believe that the increased 
institutional ownership from abroad have a disciplining effect on firm’s management. The legal use 
of pyramidal holdings and dual-class shares have allowed for closed-end investment funds, such as 
Industrivärden, to remain the controlling owner of several firms and one can therefore assume that 
these institutions have had a significant impact on firm decisions. This leads up to our hypothesis 
that there should be a negative relationship between controlling institutions and corporate cash 
holdings. 
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2.5.3 Insider ownership 
 
There has been a lot of research conducted on firms owned by its employees and the impacts it has 
on the capital structure. Jensen & Meckling’s article from 1976 has a central role in the governance 
literature and they argue that managers do not work towards optimal capital structures. Instead 
managers tend to entrench themselves against as much external monitoring as possible. They will 
therefore try to keep leverage low, which is also beneficial for the managers since it reduces the 
financial risk of the firm. Entrenched managers also dislike paying out cash to the owners since it 
dismantles their power and gives them less possibilities to spend money on investments and 
activities in their own interest. (Berger et al., 1997) 
 
Managerial entrenchment towards external sources of capital increases when managers have had 
their positions for a long time and when their compensation is not related to the company’s 
performance. (Berger et al., 1997) Increased equity compensation and management ownership is said 
to mitigate this problem and align the manager's agenda with the shareholders. (Jensen, 1986) 
 
Research has shown that the relationship between managerial ownership and levels of cash holdings 
is non-monotonic. For firms with low managerial ownership there is a negative relationship with 
cash holdings. Increased managerial ownership decreases the firms’ cash holdings. Managers seem to 
pile less cash when they own more of the company, and thus equity compensation can mitigate the 
issues related to free-cash flows. (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004) 
 
At higher levels of managerial ownership the relationship is observed to be the opposite, or in other 
words a positive relationship. For managers that already hold a substantial part of the firm, an 
increase of their ownership leads to higher cash levels and Ozkan & Ozkan (2004) found that 
corporate cash holdings rise when managers have an ownership stake in the span of 24% to 64%. 
The owning managers then get direct control of the firm as the gap between separation and control 
tightens, increasing the manager’s capability to resist external monitoring by the other shareholders. 
This entrenchment effect ought to give higher capital levels when managers own a larger block of 
the company if the total level of their ownership makes them the largest stakeholder. In this way 
they can keep the cash in the firm and control it according to their own interests without risking 
being replaced by the board. (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004) 
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Insider ownership is a broader definition than managerial ownership and includes members of the 
board etc. The definition is chosen for this study since it is a central definition on the Swedish 
market and can also be theoretically backed. The purpose of Finanspektionen’s register of insider 
persons and their ownership is to prevent the abuse of insider information, or in other words 
prevent the abuse based on information asymmetry between people within the company and the 
external owners and other stakeholders. Since the people in the register are considered to have more 
information than the rest of the owners (asymmetric information) the discussion of manager 
agendas and entrenchment is also relevant for the slightly broader definition, insider ownership.  
 
One can argue that ownership among insiders aligns the interests of shareholders and insiders and 
eliminates the principal-agent problem. As insider ownership increases, the ability for outsiders to 
monitor decreases. This would lead to more managerial entrenchment and managers would then try 
to hold more cash to pursue with private interests and benefits, leading to a positive relationship 
between insider ownership and corporate cash holdings. 
 
When managers, board members or other insiders also own a large stake of the company the agency 
costs of holding cash within the firm are expected to be smaller. This argument in combination with 
the arguments presented by Ozkan & Ozkan (2004) and the fact that our report measures the effect 
of having an insider as the largest shareholder gives us a hypothesis of a positive relationship 
between insider ownership and cash holdings.  
 
2.6 Summary of previous relevant studies 
 
“Corporate cash holdings: An empirical investigation of UK companies” 
Ozkan & Ozkan (2004) conducted their study on a sample of UK firms between 1984 - 1999. 
Besides focusing on empirical determinants of cash holdings, they also investigated the relationship 
between the controlling owner’s identity and the cash level of the firms. The UK market differs 
from i.e. the US market in terms of governance settings and this might have implications on the 
firms’ cash levels. They argue that a controlling family owner is more likely to take part in the direct 
management of a firm, and that these firms might have a different policy towards cash holdings than 
their non-family owned counterparts. Furthermore, they stated that family owned corporations 
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would have higher levels of cash and that institutionally owned firms would hold less cash due to 
more effective monitoring exerted by the financial institutions.  
 
The authors also investigated the relationship between managerial ownership and cash holdings. 
They argue that the size of the managerial ownership can have different implications for a firm’s 
cash holding policy. For small levels of managerial ownership they expect to see a negative effect on 
cash levels, illustrating the incentive-alignment effect of managerial ownership. However, after 
reaching a certain level of managerial ownership the pattern should be the reverse, i.e. reflecting the 
entrenchment effect of managerial ownership.  
 
The results found in the study partly reflect that corporate governance has implications on firms’ 
cash levels. Having a controlling family owner has a significant and positive impact on firms’ cash 
levels. The relationship between institutional ownership and firms’ cash holding was not significant. 
According to the authors, this can be explained by passive and inefficient monitoring by the 
financial institutions in the UK. The results also suggest that the relationship between managerial 
ownership and cash levels is non-monotonic. Up to a certain level of managerial ownership (24 %) 
cash levels fall. Then the pattern is reversed, illustrating a rise in cash holdings up to 64 % of 
managerial ownership. Furthermore, the authors found that cash flows and growth opportunities 
had a significant and positive impact on cash holdings, whilst leverage and bank debt had a negative 
and significant effect on firms’ cash levels.   
 
“Why Do Firms Hold Cash? Evidence from EMU Countries” 
Ferreira & Vilela (2004) investigated the determinants behind cash holdings of firms in EMU 
countries. Besides focusing on the general determinants of cash holdings they investigated the 
governance settings effect on cash levels in a variety of different countries.  By studying several 
EMU countries the authors were able to capture the variations in legal systems, ownership structure 
etc. that could have important implications on a firm’s cash holding policy.  
 
The sample consisted of publicly traded firms in EMU-countries and the time frame stretched from 
1987 to 2000. The descriptive statistics shows that the average firm held 14,8% of their total assets 
in cash and cash equivalents. However, the mean cash ratio for different countries stretched from 
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21,9% to 8,9% and the authors argue that this has to do with differences in patterns of corporate 
governance and capital markets characteristics amongst the investigated countries. 
 
To test for the effect of corporate governance on cash holdings the authors adopted a framework 
developed by La Porta et al. in 1998. This framework included dimensions such as ownership 
concentration, rule of law and creditor rights and can be used to analyze the minority investor 
protection in different countries. Ferreira & Vilela (2004) therefore ran a regression including these 
dimensions and found that firms in countries characterized by better investor protection held less 
cash on their balance sheet.  
 
Furthermore, their findings concerning determinants of cash holdings were in line with Opler et al., 
(1999) and Ozkan & Ozkan (2004). Size and leverage were negatively related to cash holdings, whilst 
market-to-book or investment opportunities had a positive effect. 
 
“The determinants and implications of corporate cash holdings” 
Opler et al. (1999) studied public listed US firms between 1971-1994 and concluded that firms with 
strong growth, high business risk and smaller size hold more cash in comparison to other firms. 
Smaller firms do not have the same access to capital markets as large firms and do therefore tend to 
stack more cash and highly levered firm usually have lower cash levels. However the author couldn’t 
find evidence for the agency theory regarding the managerial entrenchment hypothesis as an 
explanation for corporate cash holdings. 
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3. Methodology 
 
This chapter aims to outline the methodological approach used in this thesis. The purpose of this 
chapter is to provide an insight of how we have collected the data, defined our variables and how we 
have used this data in our econometric techniques. The chapter also provides a discussion of 
reliability and validity. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Since we want to study the relationship between corporate cash holdings and firm-specific 
ownership structure a quantitative approach is strongly preferred instead of a qualitative method. 
Previous research that is relevant for this study (e.g. Opler et al., 1999 and Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004) 
has all used a quantitative approach for the subject. A quantitative approach have several benefits 
since it allows for us to perform statistical tests and run regressions in order to detect relationships 
between the dependent variable and the chosen explanatory variables.  
 
We will conduct regressions on panel data, and this structure is preferred as it allows us to 
investigate and analyze the relationship between the variables both from a cross-sectional and a time 
dimension. This means that we can examine the determinants of corporate cash holdings in several 
cross-sections, in our case firms and simultaneously over several years. 
 
3.1 Sample 
 
Our sample consists of firms listed on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) main markets 
NASDAQ OMXS Large-, Mid- and Small Cap as of 2014-04-15. The firms listed on the SSE main 
markets comply with the highest standards of financial reporting, accountability and transparency 
(NASDAQ OMX, 2014).   
 
As of 2014-04-15, the SSE main market lists include a total of 256 firms: 65 firms on Large Cap, 80 
firms on Mid Cap and 111 firms on Small Cap. After excluding certain firms based on our criteria 
set up in 3.4 Exclusions we end up with a sample of 209 firms.  
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3.2 Time frame 
 
The chosen time frame stretches from 2008 to 2013. We have chosen this time frame since it 
reflects a period with increasing returns on the SSE main markets. During this time period many 
listed firms have reported record profits and thus it should have an impact on the firm’s cash 
holdings.  
 
The following chart illustrates the return on the SSE main markets between 2008 and 2013. The 
chart shows a positive trend, indicating well-performing firms and investor optimism. 
 
Source: Nasdaq OMX Nordic (2014) 
3.3 Data collection 
 
By contacting the Chief Executive Officer and the Chairman of the Swedish Database SIS 
Ägarservice, we managed to gain access to their database during a limited period of time. From this 
database we have been able to gather detailed information about the ownership structure in our 
sample firms. To gather firm specific financial data, Thompson Reuters Datastream has been 
accessed. Both databases are considered as highly reliable and thus applicable to use in this study.   
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3.4 Exclusions 
 
Harford et al. (2008) excludes all firms with SIC codes ranging from 6000 to 6999 in their data 
sample. Firms classified with these SIC-codes primarily operate in the fields of finance, insurance 
and real estate. Firms whose primary operations consist of the construction of buildings for sale are 
not included in this category (SIC Directory, 2014). 
 
Following previous research (e.g. Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004 and Harford et al., 2008) 
all financial firms are excluded from the sample. Firms classified as real estate and insurance 
companies are also excluded from the data sample. The reason for this is that these firms either have 
statutory capital requirements or that they use special accounting methods that affects the financial 
ratios and the comparability amongst firms. Ozkan & Ozkan (2004) also excludes all firm-year 
observations where they observe non-positive sales. We also adopt this criteria but we cannot 
observe any firm-year observation with negative sales.  
 
The industry classifications are retrieved from SIS Ägarservice and the excluded firms are shown in 
Appendix 1. 
 
3.5 Variables 
3.5.1 Dependent variable 
 
A dependent variable depends on other factors, and is at the center of measurement during a test 
(Brooks, 2008). Since this study aims to investigate how ownership structure affects corporate cash 
holdings, the dependent variable is corporate cash holdings. We have used the same method as 
previous studies (i.e. Ferreira and Vilela, 2004) and defined cash holdings as the ratio of cash and 
cash equivalents to total assets less cash and cash equivalents.  
 
CASH_TA= Cash and cash equivalents / (Total book value of assets - cash and cash equivalents) 
 
Some would argue that taking the natural logarithm of this ratio would reduce the skewness of the 
variable. However, since we do not want to artificially improve our data we have chosen to proceed 
with the dependent variable in its current form, which is supported by using an identical method as 
Ferreira & Vilela (2004).  
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3.5.2 Explanatory variables 
 
The explanatory (independent) variables are used to explain the behavior of the dependent variable 
(Brooks, 2008). The variables measure the owners voting rights. We have chosen to measure voting 
rights instead of capital rights, since the purpose with this study is to investigate whether the 
ultimate owner affects the cash levels of firms through their controlling position. The explanatory 
variables that measure ownership identity are collected from the database SIS Ägarservice. The 
database allows us to group owners in spheres to get a more accurate picture of the ownership 
structure in Swedish firms. The spheres consist of legally independent owners tied together by a 
constellation of formal and informal mechanisms (Fristedt & Sundqvist, 2009). The concept is 
widely used for the Swedish market and is considered very reliable (Agnblad et al., 2002). We 
collected the ownership stakes for 2013-12-31.  
 
The method of only measuring ownership at one point in time is consistent with several previous 
studies.  La Porta et al. (1999) investigated corporate ownership around the word by examining the 
ultimate controlling shareholders of large corporations in 27 countries. Their ownership data was a 
mix collected for several different years, and their method justified: 
 
 “Since ownership patterns tend to be relatively stable, the fact that the ownership data do not all come from the same 
year is not a big problem.” (La Porta et al., 1999, pp. 475) 
 
Ozkan & Ozkan (2004) measured corporate cash holding of publicly traded UK firms from 1984 to 
1999 but obtained data regarding ownership only for 1997 and motivated this with: 
 
“Given that equity ownership structure of firms in a country is relatively stable over a certain period of time, we do not 
expect that measuring ownership characteristics in a single year would yield a significant bias in our results.” 
(Ozkan & Ozkan, 1999, pp. 2119) 
 
3.5.2.1 Family owner 
 
Following the definition of Agnblad et al. (2002) all firms whose ultimate owner either is a single 
individual or a person/group of persons belonging to a controlling family are considered family 
owned corporations.  SIS Ägarservice allows us to add together all owners belonging to a certain 
family or a group of interests. The thought is that these owners vote in the same direction. After 
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doing this to our data sample, the percentage of voting rights ownership change for some firms 
while it remains the same for other firms. We then construct a variable that takes on the value 
corresponding to the controlling family owners voting rights in the firms that are controlled by 
families and zero otherwise.  
 
Family = % of total outstanding voting rights owned by the controlling family/individual 
3.5.2.2 Institutional owner 
 
Harford et al. (2008) measure institutional shareholdings as the percentage of shares held by 
institutions. We have classified institutions according to Hedlund’s (1985) definition of institutional 
owners as: investment firms, insurance companies, foundations/trusts, pension funds, 
societies/associations and other firms that invest in companies as part of their main operations.  As 
for other ownership variables we are interesting in the ultimate owner of the firms and therefore 
only include those institutional investors that are controlling owners. The variable is constructed so 
that it takes on the value corresponding to the controlling institution’s voting rights in the firms 
controlled by institutions and zero otherwise.  
 
Institution = % of total outstanding voting rights owned by the controlling institution 
3.5.2.3 Insider owner 
 
Insiders are persons that due to their position have access to insider information about the firm. The 
definition follows the criteria set up by the Swedish regulatory authority Finansinspektionen, see 
Appendix 2. SIS Ägarservice follows Finansinspektionen’s (2014) definition of a person with an 
insider position and the database allows us to get information about the insiders voting rights in 
each and every firm specifically. If an insider belongs to a controlling family owner or a group of 
owners with the same interest, it is thought of as the insider having the same voting rights as the 
controlling owner. The variable is then constructed so that it takes on the value corresponding to the 
insiders voting rights in the presence of an insider and zero otherwise. 
 
Insider = % of total outstanding voting rights owned by the controlling insider   
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3.5.2.4 Summary of hypotheses for the explanatory variables 
 
For a detailed discussion on the explanatory variables the readers are referred to section 2.3 Theory of 
ownership identity. The thought behind this section is to provide a brief summary of the expected 
relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory variables: 
 
H1: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between family ownership and corporate cash holdings 
 
H2: Ceteris paribus, there is a negative relationship between institutional ownership and corporate cash holdings 
 
H3: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive relationship between insider ownership and corporate cash holdings 
 
3.5.3 Control variables 
 
Control variables are used to test the relative impact of the explanatory variables (Brooks, 2008). We 
will use control variables as independent firm specific variables that have explained corporate cash 
holdings in several previous studies (e.g. Opler et al., 1999). The control variables are used to make 
the study more reliable and accurate. The control variables used in this study are: size, leverage, 
market-to-book, profitability and dividends. They will be presented in this section followed by their 
expected relationships to cash holdings. 
 
3.5.3.1 Size 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that asymmetric information determines the firm’s sensitivity to 
external financing. Larger firms have lower cost of capital suggesting that they suffer from less 
information asymmetry than small firms (e.g. Whited, 1992 and Kim et al., 1998). Large firms have a 
greater accessibility to external capital markets, increasing their possibilities to raise external 
financing (Opler et al., 1999). This brings us to the conclusion that larger firms are assumed to hold 
relatively smaller amounts of cash than small-sized firms, and we therefore expect a negative 
relationship between firm size and cash holdings. 
 
Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of net sales or revenues, represented by gross sales 
and other operating income minus discounts, returns and allowances.   
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Size = Natural logarithm of net sales 
 
3.5.3.2 Leverage 
 
In line with The Pecking Order theory firms prefer using internally generated cash instead of 
financing investments with debt (Myers, 1984). This indicates a negative relationship between 
leverage and cash holdings. Highly levered firms would have less cash in their accounts, due to the 
logic that they spend their cash prior taking on debt. 
 
Another argument for a negative relationship between leverage and cash holdings is presented by 
John (1993), who states that leverage is a substitute for holding cash. Firm that are debt financed 
have proven to easier take on further debt, making leverage a proxy for the firms ability to raise 
debt.  
 
After taking the arguments in consideration we expect leverage to have a negative relationship to 
cash holdings. This is in line with previous research i.e. Ozkan & Ozkan (2004), even if one can 
argue that leverage increases the risk of financial distress, which can be compensated by holdings 
cash. 
 
As in Opler et al. (1999) leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Total debt 
includes all interest bearing short and long-term debt and capitalized lease obligations.  
 
Leverage = Total debt / Total assets 
 
3.5.3.3 Market-to-book 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that asymmetric information determines the firm’s sensitivity to 
external financing. For firms whose value is determined by it’s growth opportunities the asymmetric 
information is presumed to be large, since it is hard for external creditors and investors to value 
these opportunities. This may lead to firms passing on good investment opportunities if they are 
poorly capitalized, which indicates that these firms have to finance their investments to a greater 
extent with internal sources (cash) than others. 
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Since those firms’ value is based on opportunities, the underlying value driver is very intangible and 
volatile in its nature. This increases the firms’ costs for bankruptcy and financial distress. 
(Williamson, 1988; Harris & Raviv, 1990; Shleifer & Vishny, 1992) To compensate for the increased 
risk and to avoid distress these firms need to hold more cash. (Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004) 
 
This report measures growth opportunities as market to book, following Ozkan & Ozkan’s (2004) 
method, which found that market to book has a significantly negative relationship with cash 
holdings. Following the previous argumentation that firms with large growth opportunities suffer 
from high asymmetric information and are more exposed to financial distress, they are presumed to 
hold higher cash levels. We therefore expect a positive relationship between market-to-book and 
cash holdings. 
 
The market-to-book ratio is measured as the total book value assets minus total shareholder equity 
plus the market value of equity (share price multiplied by outstanding shares) divided by the total 
book value of assets (Opler et al., 1999).  
 
Mkt_Book = Total assets - total shareholder equity + market value of equity / total assets 
 
3.5.3.4 Profitability  
 
Profitable firms can easily finance their investments with internal funds (Dittmar et. al, 2003). Firms 
that generate positive cash flows from their operations are less dependent on storing large cash 
reserves on their balance sheets, which indicates a negative relationship to cash holdings. This 
relationship is also in line with Myers and Majluf’s (1984) argument that asymmetric information 
determines a firm's sensitivity to external financing. Operating profits from the firm's operations is 
easy for external financiers and investors to value, which increases their possibilities to raise external 
financing. Profitable firms should therefore have smaller needs to hold cash, since they easily can 
raise external funds to finance their investments. 
 
Profitability is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) 
to net sales. 
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Profitability = EBITDA / net sales 
 
3.5.3.5 Dividends  
 
Opler et al. (1999) argue that firms that pay dividends can hold less cash since they can cut dividends 
to raise financing.  This makes them less dependent of external capital markets. The dividend 
dummy variable is included in this study since it has shown to explain cash holdings in previous 
studies, i.e. Opler et al (1999). We expect a negative relationship between firms that pay dividends 
and cash holdings and this is in line with the hypothesis in previous studies (e.g. Opler et al., (1999) 
and Ozkan & Ozkan (2004)). 
 
Dividend is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for every firm-year observation where that 
firm paid a dividend to their shareholders. The variable takes on the value of 0 for every firm-year 
observation where that firm did not pay any dividends to their shareholders. We also assume that 
the firms did not pay any dividends for all the firm-year observations where we have missing 
observations.  
 
DV_Div = 1 if the firm paid dividends, otherwise 0  
 
3.6 Econometric techniques 
 
In order to empirically examine the research questions of this study several multiple regressions will 
be conducted, examined and analyzed. A multiple regression is used in order to analyze the 
relationship between a dependent variable (y) and a set of independent variables (x). This is 
conducted in an effort to explain the relationship between the dependent and independent variables.  
(Wooldridge, 2009) 
 
The data set in this study consists of both cross-sectional and time-series data. The firms in the 
sample can be observed as different cross section units, whereas the time-series refers to the time 
period between 2008-2013. Due to the nature of the data, it constitutes as panel data. 
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In order to investigate the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables in this 
study, the method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) will be used. The OLS-method is widely used in 
regression analysis and the software program E-Views will be used for the regressions in this study.  
 
3.7 Regressions  
 
In order to increase the validity of our model, we ran several regressions to ensure that the results 
are robust using. The first regression model includes the dependent variable and the explanatory 
variables, excluding the control variables. 
 
Model 1: 
 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝑇𝐴!" =   𝛼 +   𝛽  !!   𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦!" +   𝛽  !!   𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟!" +   𝛽!!     𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" +     𝛽!!     𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!" +   𝜀!"   
 
The control variables were then added one by one to examine their impact on the regression results. 
The following regression models were estimated: 
 
Model 2: 
 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝑇𝐴!" =   𝛼 +   𝛽  !!   𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦!" +   𝛽  !!   𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟!" +   𝛽!!     𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" +     𝛽!!     𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!" + 𝜀!" 
 
Model 3: 
 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝑇𝐴!" =   𝛼 +   𝛽  !!   𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦!" +   𝛽  !!   𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟!" +   𝛽!!     𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" +     𝛽!!     𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!" +      𝛽!!   𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒!" + 𝜀!" 
 
Model 4: 
 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝑇𝐴!" =   𝛼 +   𝛽  !!   𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦!! +   𝛽  !!   𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟!" +   𝛽!!     𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" +     𝛽!!     𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!" +      𝛽!!   𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒!" +   𝛽!!   𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡/𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘!" + 𝜀!" 
 
Model 5: 
 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝑇𝐴!" =   𝛼 +   𝛽  !!   𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦!" +   𝛽  !!   𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟!" +   𝛽!!     𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" +     𝛽!!     𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!" +      𝛽!!   𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒!" +   𝛽!!   𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡/𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘!"+   𝛽!!   𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦!" + 𝜀!" 
 
Model 6: 
 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝑇𝐴!" =   𝛼 +   𝛽  !!   𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦!" +   𝛽  !!   𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟!" +   𝛽!!     𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!" +     𝛽!!     𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒!" +      𝛽!!   𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒!" +   𝛽!!   𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡/𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘!"+   𝛽!!   𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦!! +   𝛽  !!   𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑!" + 𝑒!" 
 
 
Model 6 is the final model, including all variables in this study. 
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3.8 Reliability and validity 
 
Reliability is of great importance for a study of this character. Reliability essentially means that the 
results are replicable given the same data (Bryman & Bell, 2005). A possible reliability problem is the 
usage of secondary data, since we cannot control for the quality of the data. Datastream and SIS 
Ägarservice, where the data is gathered from, are considered as trustworthy sources and thus the 
problems with reliability are modest. 
 
Validity is another subject of great importance. Shortly it can be explained as something that is 
adequate and legitimate, and that the variables used in the study rightfully measures what’s ought to 
be measured (Bryman & Bell, 2005). Since the variables are chosen in accordance to previous 
research it can be concluded that this study has high validity.  
 
Our econometric method follows previous reliable studies where OLS regressions have been used 
(e.g. Opler et al., 1999 and Ozkan & Ozkan, 2004). We have also performed several robustness tests 
to ensure that the regression model is reliable, and a detailed discussion about our model and the 
assumptions underlying it are followed below. 
 
3.8.1 Heteroscedasticity 
 
Heteroscedasticity occurs when the residuals are correlated with the explanatory variables. Since E-
views does not have a built in function for testing panel data for heteroscedasticity we conducted a 
manual Breusch-Pagan test for the explanatory variables. (Brooks, 2008) The manual test was done 
by using the squared residuals (RESID^2) as the dependent variable and running a regression with 
all explanatory variables. The p-value on the F-test was 0, meaning that the independent variables 
had no effects on the squared residuals. The test is thereby significant and heteroskedasticity is 
detected (see Appendix 6). Since our regressions have problems with heteroscedasticity it means that 
we need to use robust standard errors in our models, which has been done using White’s robust 
standard errors for all regression models. 
 
3.8.2 Heterogeneity 
 
Since the standard pooled regression assumes constant intercepts and coefficients, it also assumes 
that there is no correlation between the residuals in either the cross-sectional units (firms) or in the 
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time period dimension (years). This means that it does not account for heterogeneity, which could 
be a problem when using a large panel data set. (Brooks, 2008) 
 
The most common and simplest way to deal with this problem is to used a fixed effects model, 
allowing the intercept to differ across cross-section and time. An alternative to the fixed effects 
model is to use a random effects model, which is a similar model but with the difference that the 
intercepts for each unit is assumed to emerge from a common intercept (α) and are adjusted by a 
random variable (ε). (Brooks, 2008) 
 
To see whether we need to use any effects we conducted a Redundant Fixed Effects Test. Due to 
our dependent variable taking on the same values for every year it is not possible for us to use the 
fixed nor the random effects in the cross-section dimension and we can thus only test whether the 
effects are needed in the period dimension. The F-stat of the tests is found in Appendix 5 and shows 
that the null-hypothesis of no heterogeneity is accepted and no effects are needed for the time 
dimension.  
 
3.8.3 Endogeneity 
 
Endogeneity occurs when the explanatory variables are correlated with the error terms. This 
essentially means that changes in the dependent variable can explain the changes in the explanatory 
variables, and not the other way around (Wooldridge, 2009) 
 
There is a chance that corporate cash holdings can explain the ownership structure of the examined 
firms. To control for the endogeneity problem other econometric techniques can be used, such as 
two-stage least squares (2SLS). The validity of 2SLS is highly dependent on finding exogenous 
variables which can be used as instrumental variables. However, Harford et al. (2008) states that 
prior research provides little insights to which variables that are applicable. 
 
Following this reasoning and the fact that previous research (Harford et. al., 2008) suggests that 
corporate governance is more likely to explain corporate cash holdings than the other way around, 
we will proceed with the OLS regressions in its current form.  
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3.8.4 Multicollinearity 
 
Multicollinearity appears when the independent variables are correlated with each other. The 
problem arises when using several independent variables in multiple regression. The correlation 
between the explanatory variables will be non-zero, but the problem occurs when the are very highly 
correlated. (Brooks, 2008)  
 
The method for measuring multicollinearity is looking at a matrix of correlations between the 
individual explanatory variables. If the correlation coefficient is higher than 0,8, then 
multicollinearity is a problem. (Gujarati, 2002) In our correlation matrix in Appendix 3, we observe 
that no correlation coefficient exceeds 0,8 and thus, we do not have any problems with collinearity 
between the independent variables.  
 
3.8.5 Normality 
 
To test for normality in our model we have conducted a normality test, which can be found in 
Appendix 4. Non-normality is often caused by a number of observations that represent extreme 
values. These observations are called outliers and can often lead to a rejection of the normality 
assumption. How we will deal with outliers follows in section 3.7.2.6 Exclusion of outliers. After 
dealing with outliers, some tests still reject the null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals. For 
a large sample size however, violating the normality assumption is inconsequential (Brooks, 2008). 
 
3.8.6 Exclusion of outliers 
 
Outliers are extreme observations that deviate from the pattern of the remainder of the data sample. 
Extreme observations are normal to encounter when doing financial modeling (Brooks, 2008). We 
have chosen to trim the dependent variable and the control variables at the first percentile in both 
tails. The same procedure is used by Opler et al. (1999). By doing this the observations become 
more normally distributed and the results easier to interpret. Trimming of the variables have been 
conducted in the econometric software package E-Views.   
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3.8.7 Limitations 
 
We have still chosen to proceed with panel data even if there is a risk that the regression could suffer 
from heterogeneity in the cross-section dimension, since it can’t be tested due to the time invariance 
in ownership structures. The use of panel data makes it possible to get a better understanding of the 
complex task to explain the determinants of corporate cash holdings, hence our choice of method. 
The use of panel data also allows us to examine the variables relationship to each other and the 
interesting dynamical change in them over time. By only conducting the regression on one year 
instead of using panel data would not give us more accurate results and would especially increase the 
risk of biased results since the one year observations could differ a lot from the previous and 
following years. 
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4. Results 
 
In the following chapter the results from the regressions are presented. The chapter begins with 
descriptive statistics followed by the results from the six regression models. 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
 
  Cash/TA Leverage Size Mkt_Book Profitability Dividends Family Insider Institution 
 Mean 0,13 0,22 14,84 1,48 0,08 0,66 23,39 13,21 3,12 
 Median 0,08 0,20 14,64 1,24 0,10 1,00 22,40 0,00 0,00 
 Maximum 3,34 0,63 19,24 7,78 0,67 1,00 84,90 84,90 43,00 
 Minimum 0,00 0,00 10,25 0,51 -5,07 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 
 Std, Dev, 0,21 0,14 1,94 0,84 0,28 0,47 23,23 22,46 7,98 
 Skewness 7,71 0,39 0,14 2,93 -9,56 -0,68 0,63 1,56 3,10 
 Kurtosis 93,19 2,36 2,52 16,34 150,24 1,46 2,39 4,16 12,97 
 
Observations 888 888 888 888 888 888 888 888 888 
 
The descriptive statistics shows that the average firm hold 13% of their net assets in cash and cash 
equivalents. This result is slightly higher than in Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) who found that the mean 
cash ratio amongst their sample was 9,9%.  Our results are somewhat closer to the findings of 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) who found that the average company in their sample held 14,8% of their 
total net assets in cash and cash equivalents.  
 
Furthermore, we can see that a few of the explanatory- and control variables also differ in terms of 
maximum and minimum values. This supports the use of fixed effects in the regressions and a 
further discussion concerning this can be found in section 3.7.2.2 Heterogeneity.  
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4.2 Regression results 
 
Model: Predicted 
sign 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Dependent 
variable: Cash/TA Cash/TA Cash/TA Cash/TA Cash/TA Cash/TA 
                
C   0.300304 1.138769 0.572395 0.384006 0.301072 0.266553 
    (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** 
                
FAMILY +  -0.004148 -0.002128 -0.001024 -0.001018 -0.000978 -0.000887 
    (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0072)*** (0.0076)*** (0.0066)*** (0.0132)** 
                
INSIDER + 0.001930 0.000218 3.75E-05 0.000365 0.000546 0.000637 
    (0.0000)*** (0.6057) (0.8764) (0.1571) (0.0499)** (0.0216)** 
                
INSTITUTION - -0.003844 -0.001676 -0.001029 -0.001132 -0.001146 -0.001129 
    (0.0000)*** (0.1448) (0.2021) (0.1097) (0.0968)* (0.0947)* 
                
SIZE -   -0.060616 -0.025277 -0.021636 -0.014622 -0.011270 
      (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0007)*** (0.0052)*** 
                
LEVERAGE -     -0.158187 -0.081896 -0.113783 -0.119509 
        (0.0347)** (0.3233) (0.1346) (0.1154) 
                
MKT_BOOK +       0.074613 0.071013 0.072698 
          (0.0000)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0001)*** 
                
PROFITABILITY -         -0.158850 -0.153725 
            (0.0544)* (0.0605)* 
                
DIVIDENDS -           -0.030663 
              (0.0125)** 
                
Observations:   888 888 888 888 888 888 
R-squared:   0.030176 0.130171 0.083768 0.173001 0.200072 0.203537 
Prob(F-statistic)   0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
F-statistic:   12.45641 43.06209 17.15160 31.44837 31.44274 28.07867 
 
***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
The first regression included only the independent ownership variables. This regression had a 
coefficient of determination (R!) of 3,02%, meaning that the ownership variables describes 3,02% of 
the differences in cash levels amongst firms listed on the SSE main markets.  
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The results from the first regression show that family ownership and institutional ownership are 
significant with a negative coefficient. This means that firms controlled by larger family and 
institutional owners have less cash in their firms. Insider ownership also had a statistically significant 
influence on cash holdings with a positive coefficient. This means that the larger the controlling 
insider owner is, the more cash was held in the companies. 
 
In the second regression the control variable size was added in an attempt to increase the 
explanatory power of the model. The R!was now 13,01%, substantially higher than in the first 
regression. This increase was expected since the control variables ought to influence the results and 
are used primarily due to this reason. Size was significant and showed that larger firms hold a smaller 
proportion of their net assets in cash. In this regression family ownership was the only significant 
ownership variable and demonstrated the same relationship as in the first regression. The remaining 
variables: institution and insider were not significant.   
 
In the third regression leverage was added and was significant with a negative coefficient. This 
means that higher leverage results in lower cash levels in firms. Apart from this, the results were in 
line with the second regression, but the family coefficient was smaller indicating that family 
ownership has a smaller impact on cash holdings.  
 
In the fourth and the fifth regression, market-to-book and profitability were added as control 
variables. In both regressions the control variables except leverage were significant and the expected 
relationships were observed. The independent variables showed the same relationships as in the 
previous regressions. Family ownership remained significant in regression four and five, whilst 
insider ownership and institutional ownership only were significant in regression five. 
 
In the final regression model we added the dividend dummy variable as a control. This variable was 
significant with a negative relationship, which is in line with our hypothesis that payouts decrease 
cash holdings. Family- and insider owner were significant at 5%-level whilst institutional owners 
only were significant at the 10%-level. Leverage was now almost significant with a p-value of 11% 
and had a negative impact on cash holdings. The remaining controls (size, market-to-book and 
profitability) were significant and the observed relationships were in line with the previous 
regressions and our expectations.  
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In the final model including all independent and control variables the coefficient of determination 
(R!) was 20,4%. This means that our model can explain 20,4% of the deviations in cash holdings. 
This result is in line with several previous studies such as Ozkan & Ozkan (2004). The relationships 
for the examined variables remained throughout the regressions, but some of the coefficients 
demonstrated a volatile significance pattern. The coefficients of the explanatory variables were small 
and tended to decrease in size as we added the control variables. This indicates that the explanatory 
variables affect cash holdings, but to a limited extent.  
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5. Analysis 
 
The following table summarizes the expected and observed relationships in regression model 6. It 
shows whether the variables are significant or not and if the observed relationships were in line with 
our hypotheses. As we can see, some relationships are different from what we expected, and this in 
combination with the significance levels will serve as a foundation for our analysis.  
 
Variable Significant on the 
5 %-level 
Expected 
relationship 
Observed 
relationship 
1. Family ✓ Positive Negative 
2. Insider ✓ Positive Positive 
3. Institution ☓ Negative Insignificant 
4. Size ✓ Negative Negative 
5. Leverage ☓ Negative Insignificant 
6. Mkt_Book ✓ Positive Positive 
7. Profitability ☓ Negative Insignificant 
8. Dividends ✓ Negative Negative 
 
The results show that besides the family variable, the significant variables are in line with our 
expectations. In a closer examination we can observe that insider ownership had a positive relation 
to cash holdings and that institutional ownership was insignificant. Three of the examined control 
variables were significant at the 5%-level with relationships in line with previous research. This 
indicates that our model is robust and that at least a few of the financial ratios that have proven to 
influence cash flows on foreign markets, also holds in a Swedish context. Market-to-book, which 
measures growth opportunities has a positive relationship to cash holdings. This result, together 
with the variable size that indicates that larger firm with better access to capital market hold less cash 
are in line with the findings of Opler et al., (1999). Since a deeper analysis of the control variables is 
beyond the scope of this study, they will not be further analyzed.  For a further discussion on the 
control variables, the readers are referred to Opler et al. (1999) and Ozkan & Ozkan (2004).  
 
The findings concerning the family variable are interesting in several aspects. First off, the variable is 
significant indicating that controlling family owners have an impact on corporate cash holdings. 
Secondly, the relationship between family ownership and cash holdings is negative, something that 
contradicts previous research and our hypothesis.  
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So what could explain this relationship? The Swedish governance setting is interesting in many ways, 
with several controlling family owners that have retained their positions through decades. One 
example is the Wallenberg family that controls several large corporations on the SSE main markets. 
One can argue that families such as the Wallenberg family not necessarily fits in to the general 
definition of family owners, since they according to Agnblad et al. (2002) controls firms in many 
different industries, that at the time of their study was worth nearly half of the SSE market value. 
We can therefore presume that they manage their investments as professional portfolio managers in 
a more institutional way rather than behaving as the typical family owner passing on the family 
business to their children from generation to generation. Besides the Wallenberg family, there are 
several other financial families controlling a substantial value on the SSE main markets. Presumably, 
they also control their firms in a more institutional way, focusing on monitoring and disciplining of 
management, hence resulting in lower cash holdings. 
 
We also know that informal mechanisms play an important role in the Swedish governance setting. 
Even though arrangements such as pyramidal holdings and dual class shares are allowed, we seldom 
see any cases of minority abuse. Social status and reputation is of great importance to the controlling 
family owners and thus it would be hard to justify policies that ultimately could lead to value 
destruction of their firms. Since many family owners have been in business for a long time, one can 
argue that they have a long-term perspective aiming to please all the stakeholders instead of 
themselves only. One way of securing the future well being of their firms is to reduce the cash 
available for self-serving managers and that could be another explanation to the observed 
relationship. 
 
Ozkan & Ozkan (2004) argued that it is common for family controlled firms to have family 
members in the management team. It is fair to assume that the connections between owners and 
management are closer in these cases, and that they share the same agenda of maximizing the value 
of the firm. This indicates that the stewardship theory is better suited to explain the managerial 
behavior for family owned companies. This would imply that managers prioritize the well being of 
the organization, rather than maximizing their own utility. And since research have shown that 
holding too much cash can be detrimental to firm value, high cash levels would not be in line with 
the steward’s objectives. This reasoning would imply that family owned firms managed by stewards 
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would have lower levels of cash holdings. Based on this reasoning our results are in line with the 
theory.  
 
Our results show that insider ownership has a statistically significant positive relationship to Swedish 
firm’s cash holdings. Previous studies have mainly focused on managerial ownership and have found 
the same relationship, but our results show that the relationship also holds for insider ownership, 
which is a slightly broader definition.  
 
One possible explanation to our results is the entrenchment effect. The underlying concept of the 
entrenchment effect is that managers and other insiders entrench themselves to external players in 
order to maximize their own utility. This is exercised by taking decisions and carrying out actions 
aiming to minimize outsiders’ control of the firm.  The entrenchment could lead to higher cash 
levels within the firm since the insiders have ultimate control over the decision power through their 
existence in management and the board. Insiders differ from other ownership identities, since they 
by nature have closer connections to the firms. Due to inside information, the entrenchment effect 
of knowing what is best for the firm, and not wanting outsiders to get control, could increase the 
willingness to store the firm’s cash internally. By doing this, the exposure to external monitoring is 
decreased. 
 
Insider entrenchment towards other shareholders could be another explanation to higher cash 
holdings. The categorization of ultimate owners is based on voting rights and not capital rights since 
we aim to examine the identity of the owner that has the controlling position. The Swedish dual-
class share system, further explained in chapter 2.2.1 Ownership and Control in Sweden, becomes very 
important when analyzing the positive relationship between insider ownership and cash holdings. 
Since many Swedish firms have dual-class shares that separate voting rights from capital rights, the 
insiders largely control the firms’ capital as long as it stays within the firm. The decision to pay out 
the firms’ cash holdings is taken on the annual meeting, where the shareholders power is determined 
by their voting rights. If the largest shareholder is an insider that has larger voting rights than capital 
rights due to dual-class shares, she has strong incentives to vote against dividends. By paying out the 
cash, she would get a smaller proportion of the cash since her shares entitles her to more votes, 
rather than capital rights. If the insider owner instead exercises her power to keep the cash within 
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the firm, the insiders can control the cash. This gives the insider owner incentives to keep the cash 
within the firm, yielding higher cash holdings. 
 
Ozkan & Ozkan (2004) found that the relationship between cash holdings and managerial 
ownership is non-monotonic. Up to a certain level of managerial ownership cash holdings decrease, 
whilst increasing at a higher level of managerial ownership. Although it would be interesting to 
investigate whether a similar pattern holds on the Swedish market, our method does not allow us to 
measure the effect of different ownership thresholds. Despite this, the general picture is that 
increased managerial ownership leads to higher levels of corporate cash holdings. This should 
ultimately lead to lower agency costs between managers and shareholders since their interests are 
aligned. Our results for insider ownership are therefore in line with our hypothesis, previous 
research and can be supported by corporate governance theory. 
 
The results from the institutional variable are insignificant at the 5%-level and are in line with the 
findings of Ozkan & Ozkan (2004). The variable is significant at the 10%-level which indicates that 
institutional owners have some effect on corporate cash holdings, albeit a bit weaker than the other 
ownership variables. The coefficient is negative which indicates that larger institutional owners have 
a negative effect on cash holdings. 
 
The substantial capital inflow from international institutions to the Swedish stock markets has put 
pressure on the Swedish corporate governance setting. Agnblad et al. (2002) states that international 
institutional investors are pressuring the system, which indicates that institutions desire more control 
in the firms they are investing in. This indicates that the international capital inflows could have lead 
to increased monitoring of firms, resulting in decreased cash holdings, which in turn would support 
our negative relationship. 
 
The observed weak relationship can be analyzed in several dimensions. Since there is competition 
for customers amongst the institutions, the institution that offers the lowest administrative fees will 
probably attract the most customers. However, low administrative fees ultimately implies less 
resources to monitor firms they have invested in, and that can be one explanation to our results. We 
can also observe a trend where several institutions rely on external expertise and buy services and 
recommendations. This has lead to institutions slimming their organizations and taking a less active 
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role themselves in the governance of the firms they have invested in. We also know that the 
regulatory setting in Sweden has a limiting effect on how much influence some institutions can 
practice. This could explain the weak relationship between institutional owners and corporate cash 
holdings.  
 
The discussion above analyzes the results observed in regression model 6. In the first regression 
model we only included the explanatory variables. They were all significant but the coefficient of 
determination was low, indicating that the variables explained little of the variation in cash holdings. 
The results were expected: ownership identity alone should not fully explain the levels of cash in 
Swedish firms.  
 
We therefore included control variables one at the time in order to optimize the fit of the model. 
Through all regressions, the family variable was significant and showed the same relationship to cash 
holdings. However, including control variables clearly affected the significance of the other two 
explanatory variables: insider- and institutional ownership. One can therefore question their impact 
on cash holdings and if the observed relationship is strong enough to base conclusions on.   
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6. Conclusions 
 
The question we wanted to answer in our thesis was whether the identity of the examined 
controlling owners had an impact on the cash levels in firms listed on the SSE main markets. We 
examined three main ownership identities: family, insiders and institutions and arrived at the 
following conclusions. 
 
Through our regression models we found statistical significant evidence that family owners and 
insider owners affects corporate cash holdings. We also found that some of the empirical 
determinants of cash holdings hold in a Swedish context. 
 
The family ownership variable was significant in all the regression models. This indicates that 
controlling family owners have an impact on corporate cash holdings, which is in line with previous 
research. Our observed relationship contradicts the findings in Ozkan & Ozkan (2004), which we 
motivate with a unique governance setting in Sweden, where financial families in Sweden can be 
seen as professional portfolio managers. Through their controlling position they take on an active 
role in reducing the cash levels available to potentially self-serving managers.  
 
The results from the insider ownership variable suggest that an increased level of insider ownership 
leads to higher cash holdings in firms. This indicates that insiders entrench themselves against other 
shareholders and external capital markets. By building cash reserves internally, they increase their 
independence from external monitoring and control. Insider ownership also aligns the interests 
between principal and agents and one can therefore assume that the agency costs of holding cash is 
low for these firms.  
 
Our findings of a weak negative relationship between institutional owners and cash holdings 
indicates that institutions have some effect on cash holdings and that they exercise some form of 
monitoring to mitigate managerial wasteful spending. Although the relationship is still weak, which is 
in line with Ozkan & Ozkan’s (2004) results. In their study the relationship was fully insignificant, 
which was explained by institutions in the UK being too passive and not utilizing their control rights 
to reduce cash levels. Our results show that the institutions on the Swedish market to some extent 
impacts corporate cash holdings, unlike the UK market, but simultaneously not as much as we had 
expected. Our study in combination with the results of Ozkan & Ozkan (2004) clearly raises 
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questions whether institutions really are good at monitoring? The empirical research on the 
European market questions whether they take on an active role to put pressure on the firms to hold 
less cash. 
 
Finally this study shows that ownership identities have an impact on cash holdings for firms on the 
SSE main markets. Although it is suitable to consider how big impact they actually have. In the first 
regression model that consisted of only ownership variables, the coefficient of determination was 
very low and a general analysis on the coefficient values in our regression models tells us that 
ownership has a small impact on cash holdings. The significance of the explanatory variables did 
also show a volatile pattern through the different regression models, which indicates that the 
coefficients are so close to zero that it makes them difficult to statistically secure. With this in 
consideration, our results are still interesting in several aspects. The purpose of this paper was to 
answer the question: Does the identity of the controlling shareholder impact the level of cash holdings in Swedish 
listed firms? The answer is clear; ownership identity does have an impact, even if we conclude that the 
impact is limited. Our research paper is unique and the first of it’s kind. The general results of our 
model show that the ownership identity has an impact on Swedish firms’ cash holdings, which 
contributes to the current research and knowledge on the determinants of cash holdings. The results 
bring insight and opens fruitful boulevards for further empirical research. 
 
6.1 Further research 
 
After completing this thesis we can conclude that we managed to bring important insight regarding 
the influence of ownership identity on corporate cash holdings. Despite our conclusion, several 
thoughts on further research have arisen in hindsight regarding the classifications of the explanatory 
variables. We believe that the generally accepted and previously examined categorizations of family 
and institutions are not optimal for the Swedish market. Instead of grouping all individual and family 
owners as one category, we suggest dividing them into several categories. There are several large 
families on the Swedish market (e.g. the Wallenberg family) that we believe control their firms in a 
different manner than other family business owners. It would therefore be interesting to examine 
the financial families and their relationships to cash holdings individually and see how they differ 
from firms where the founder family owns the firm. 
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Similar arguments apply to the institutional investors. Dividing them into additional categories 
would be interesting and might give more significant results. We believe that mutual funds following 
a passive index strategy might not act in the same way as closed-end funds such as Industrivärden.  
 
Further a larger sample does always give more generalizable results. By extending the time period 
and examining the listed firms with other variables in other models could contribute to explaining 
the determinants of corporate cash holdings on the Swedish market. Our study focuses on the 
ownership aspect of corporate governance and its effects. Future research can build upon our 
findings and include other governance variables in an attempt to clarify the picture of corporate cash 
holdings.  
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Appendix 1: Excluded firms 
 
Company Industry List 
Atrium Ljungberg Real Estate Large Cap 
Avanza Bank Holding Financial Services Mid Cap 
Balder Real Estate Mid Cap 
Bure Equity Financial Services Mid Cap 
Castellum Real Estate Large Cap 
Catena Real Estate Mid Cap 
Corem Property Group Real Estate Mid Cap 
Creades Financial Services Mid Cap 
Diös Fastigheter Real Estate Mid Cap 
East Capital Explorer Financial Industries Mid Cap 
Fabege Real Estate Large Cap 
Fast Partner Real Estate Mid Cap 
Havsfrun Financial Services Small Cap 
Heba Real Estate Mid Cap 
Hemfosa Fastigheter Real Estate Mid Cap 
Hufvudstaden Real Estate Large Cap 
Industrivärden Financial Services Large Cap 
Intrum Justitia Financial Services Large Cap 
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Investor Financial Services Large Cap 
JM Real Estate Large Cap 
Kinnevik Financial Services Large Cap 
Kungsleden Real Estate Mid Cap 
Klövern Real Estate Mid Cap 
Latour Financial Services Large Cap 
Lundbergs Financial Services Large Cap 
Melker Schörling Financial Services Large Cap 
Midway Holding Financial Services Small Cap 
NAXS Nordic Acces Buyout 
Fund 
Financial Services Small Cap 
Nordea Bank Banks Large Cap 
Nordnet Financial Services Mid Cap 
Novestra Financial Services Small Cap 
Platzer Fastigheter Holding Real Estate Mid Cap 
Ratos Financial Services Large Cap 
Sagax Real Estate Mid Cap 
SEB Banks Large Cap 
SHB Banks Large Cap 
Svolder Financial Services Small Cap 
Swedbank Banks Large Cap 
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Traction Financial Services Small Cap 
Tribona Real Estate Mid Cap 
Victoria Park Real Estate Mid Cap 
Vostok Nafta Investment Ltd Financial Services Mid Cap 
Wallenstam Real Estate Large Cap 
Wihlborgs Real Estate Mid Cap 
Öresund Financial Services Mid Cap 
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Appendix 2: Definition of insider person. 
 
Persons with an insider position 
Persons with an insider position who through their position in the company are considered to 
very likely have access to insider information about the company. The following persons have an 
insider position:  
   
● a member or alternate member of the company's or its parent company's board of 
directors 
● a managing director or deputy managing director of the company or its parent company 
● an auditor or deputy auditor of the company or its parent company 
● a partner in a partnership that is the company's parent company, though not a limited 
partner 
● a holder of an other senior executive post or qualified function of a permanent nature at 
the company or its parent company, if the post or function can normally be considered to 
have access to non-public information on circumstances that may affect the company's share 
price 
● a holder of a senior executive post or a service provider in accordance with points 1-3 
and 5 above in a subsidiary if they may normally be considered to have access to non-
public information which may affect the company’s share price 
● larger shareholders who themselves, together with one or more natural or legal persons in 
concert or through a company, own at least ten per cent of the share capital or number of 
votes for all shares in the company 
 
Source: Finansinspektionen, 2014-05-10 
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Appendix 3: Correlation matrix 
 
Correlation Cash/TA Leverage Size Mkt_Book Profitability Dividends Family Insider Institution 
Cash/TA 1.00                 
Leverage -0.15 1.00               
Size -0.24 0.20 1.00             
Mkt_Book 0.32 -0.16 -0.07 1.00           
Profitability -0.26 -0.04 0.28 -0.04 1.00         
Dividends -0.16 0.02 0.43 0.05 0.24 1.00       
Family -0.08 0.06 -0.03 -0.07 0.05 0.22 1.00     
Insider -0.01 -0.03 -0.17 -0.07 0.04 0.16 0.71 1.00   
Institution -0.03 -0.07 0.10 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.39 -0.23 1.00 
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Appendix 4: Normality test 
 
Normality test for regression model 6 
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Appendix 5: Redundant: Fixed Effects Tests 
 
Redundant Fixed Effects Tests   
Equation: EQ_ALL   
Test period fixed effects   
     
     Effects Test Statistic   d.f.  Prob.  
     
     Period F 0.398452 (5,874) 0.8501 
Period Chi-square 2.021867 5 0.8461 
     
          
Period fixed effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: CASH_TA_TRM  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/22/14   Time: 16:58   
Sample: 2008 2013   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 186   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 888  
White diagonal standard errors & covariance (d.f. corrected) 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.266553 0.053370 4.994444 0.0000 
LEVERAGE_TRM -0.119509 0.075839 -1.575835 0.1154 
LN_SALES_TRM -0.011270 0.004022 -2.802345 0.0052 
MKT_BOOK_TRM 0.072698 0.018088 4.019070 0.0001 
PROFITABILITY_TRM -0.153725 0.081790 -1.879496 0.0605 
DV_DIV -0.030663 0.012246 -2.503916 0.0125 
FAMILY -0.000887 0.000357 -2.482445 0.0132 
INSIDER 0.000637 0.000277 2.300755 0.0216 
INSTITUTION -0.001129 0.000675 -1.672687 0.0947 
     
     R-squared 0.203537    Mean dependent var 0.132869 
Adjusted R-squared 0.196288    S.D. dependent var 0.210121 
S.E. of regression 0.188373    Akaike info criterion -0.490701 
Sum squared resid 31.19080    Schwarz criterion -0.442164 
Log likelihood 226.8714    Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.472148 
F-statistic 28.07867    Durbin-Watson stat 0.772251 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Appendix 6: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Test 
 
Dependent Variable: RESIDSQUARED  
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Date: 05/22/14   Time: 17:03   
Sample: 2008 2013   
Periods included: 6   
Cross-sections included: 186   
Total panel (unbalanced) observations: 888  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.076443 0.093323 0.819128 0.4129 
LEVERAGE_TRM 0.194616 0.075640 2.572922 0.0102 
LN_SALES_TRM -0.008540 0.006505 -1.312747 0.1896 
MKT_BOOK_TRM 0.065752 0.012583 5.225517 0.0000 
PROFITABILITY_TRM -0.240777 0.039091 -6.159442 0.0000 
DV_DIV -0.023218 0.025668 -0.904548 0.3660 
FAMILY -0.000915 0.000687 -1.332441 0.1831 
INSIDER 0.000339 0.000680 0.499049 0.6179 
INSTITUTION -0.001252 0.001431 -0.874896 0.3819 
     
     R-squared 0.098901    Mean dependent var 0.035125 
Adjusted R-squared 0.090700    S.D. dependent var 0.323365 
S.E. of regression 0.308352    Akaike info criterion 0.494935 
Sum squared resid 83.57627    Schwarz criterion 0.543472 
Log likelihood -210.7512    Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.513489 
F-statistic 12.05949    Durbin-Watson stat 1.062526 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
      
